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SPECIAL ISSUES IN TEXAS
PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF SPECIAL
ISSUES IN TEXAS
Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr.*
I
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A GENERAL CHARGE AND SPECIAL ISSUE
SUBMISSION AND THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EACH
P RIOR to 1913 most cases in Texas were submitted to the
jury by general charge.1 This type of charge usually asks the
jury but two questions, though sometimes a third question on
damages is included. The first question asks, in effect, whether the
plaintiff should recover and, if so, what amount; the other ques-
tion, which should be answered only if the first is answered ad-
versely to the plaintiff, asks the jury to find for the defendant. The
various legal principles which the jury should consider in answer-'
ing are covered by instructions. These include the matter of burden
of proof and definitions of legal terms. They also include guides
by which the jury can fix the amount of damages.2
The argument in favor of this type of submission is that usually
the charge will be relatively short and the jury will have no dif-
ficulty in interpreting the questions. The argument against this
type of submission is two-fold: first, it tempts the jury to decide
which party the jury desires to win completely aside from the
instructions included in the charge, and then to carry out this
decision by answering the questions in such a way as to accomplish
the desired result; second, it is an obvious fact that a jury will
give more serious consideration to questions it has to answer than
it will to instructions.
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; member of the Texas State Bar..
1 SPEER, LAW OF SPECIAL ISSUES IN TEXAS (1932) xi.
2 For an example, see 1 STAYTON ANNOTATED TEXAS FORMS (1948) § 493.
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Special issue submission consists of asking the jury a specific
question on each controlling or ultimate fact involved in the law
suit, leaving it to the judge to apply the law to the answers of the
jury. This practice contemplates that the charge will include in-
structions defining words with peculiar legal meanings and guiding
the jury in other respects; primarily, however, the charge consists
of questions. The objections to this type of submission include the
following: it is often difficult to determine when a fact is sufficiently
ultimate or controlling, and, also, when it is too ultimate to be
included; further, some charges include so many issues that the
questions become too voluminous to be practicable and become
confusing to the jury. The argument in favor of this type of sub-
mission is that it forces juries to commit themselves by express
answers as to the ultimate and controlling fact questions in the
lawsuit.
It is believed that experience has shown that the argument that
special issue submission requires the jury to commit itself by
answers is stronger than the total of all the arguments in favor of
general submission. Thus, it is believed, our present practice of
requiring special issue submission, unless such submission is
waived by all parties and the judge,8 is far superior to the old
practice of submitting a case by a general charge. Continuing
efforts should be and are being made to simplify the special issue
form of submission. It takes no more than a reading of the older
cases, reversing for errors in special issues charges, and the more
recent cases involving this question to support the statement that
the greatest advancements in this field have been the result of the
trend in appellate decisions in favor of giving the trial court broad
discretion in determining what issues should be included and thus
not encouraging a trial judge to submit various issues which he
thinks are covered by his original tentative charge.
8 Tx. RULES CIV. PROC. (VERNON, 1942) Rule 277. This Rule includes a provision
that for good cause shown a general charge can be used; however, such cause never
has been and probably never will be shown.
References hereinafter made to various "Rules" will be understood as relating to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
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II
SPECIAL ISSUES WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED
(a) In general. Only relevant, ultimate, disputed fact issues
supported by pleading, except when pleading is waived, should
be submitted.
By "relevant issues" is meant issues which have something to
do with the lawsuit. For example, in a negligence case based upon
a collision in Dallas, the question might be asked whether the
State Capitol Building is located in Austin, Texas. Obviously,
the answer of the jury to this question could have nothing to do
with the outcome of the lawsuit.
By an ultimate issue is meant an issue which, standing alone,
could constitute an essential part of plaintiff's cause of action or
of an affirmative defense. This definition will not cover a rebuttal
issue - that is, one which involves a fact issue which would
usually be admissible under a general denial. This type of issue
will be discussed later.
The matter of determining whether an issue is too ultimate,
whether it is sufficiently ultimate or whether it is evidentiary is the
one which gives the most difficulty in special issue submission.
For example, it could be argued that logically in a collision case
the ultimate issues would be (1) whether there was a collision,
(2) whether the collision was caused by negligence, (3) whether
the negligence was a proximate cause of the collision and (4)
the amount of damages. Submission in this form, however, would
be subject to all of the objections applicable to a general charge.'
There is an analogy here to special exceptions to a pleading.
which is in general terms. Thus, a special exception asking that
the plaintiff be required to plead the acts relied upon as constitut-
ing negligence should be sustained, and the plaintiff should be
required to set forth the specific acts. Here, as in special issue
• Of course if the question of collision were in dispute, a preliminary issue as to
collision would be correct.
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submission, the plaintiff is met with the problem of what acts are
sufficiently ultimate and what acts are evidentiary; however, with
reference to pleadings, the fact that evidentiary facts are pleaded
usually is immaterial,5 whereas in special issue submission the
fact that an issue is evidentiary may result in a verdict which will
not support a judgment.
No rule can be formulated which will definitely distinguish
between a fact too ultimate, a fact sufficiently ultimate and an
evidentiary fact. As Chief Justice Alexander said, this matter can
be covered better by illustration than by statements of rules."
However, several rules which will frequently arrive at a proper
result can be formulated. One is that if the act is active or affirma-
tive as distinguished from latent or passive, probably it will be
held sufficiently ultimate. Another is that the trial court has
broad discretion in solving this difficult problem.
Because it is thought that it will be helpful, a collision case
will be used by way of illustration, and several terms will be used
which will not be found elsewhere.
If a collision case were to be submitted in what logically is its
ultimate form, the only questions would be as to collision, negli-
gence, proximate cause and damages. It would be a correct analy-
sis of such submission to call its submission of plaintiff's primary
cause of action, which would consist of a primary root issue,
collision, with the primary ancillary issues of negligence, proxi-
mate cause and damages. The reason the collision is called the
root issue is that it is the fact that is the very basis of the cause
of action. The issues of negligence, proximate cause and damages
are not reached unless and until it is determined that there was
a collision.
As indicated, it is clear that either party upon proper com-
plaint would be entitled to a more specific submission of plaintiff's
cause of action. Thus, the defendant would be entitled to have
Ru , 45.C.p
SSHAFER, ANNi. RULES' OF Civ. PROC. IN TEXAS (1948), Appendix, pp. xliv.liv
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each ultimate disputed act of negligence submitted, and each
such act would be accompanied by its ancillary issues of negli-
gence and proximate cause. For example, suppose that in a colli-
sion case plaintiff alleged that defendant was driving at an excess-
ive rate of speed, to-wit, about 40 miles per hour, and that he
lost control of his car, each such act constituting negligence, which
negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. Assuming dis-
puted fact issues, these contentions could be submitted as follows:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
was driving his car at a rate of speed of about forty miles an hour at
the time and on the occasion in question?"
Answer "yes" or "no."
If you have answered the foregoing issue "yes," then you will an-
swer the following question; otherwise, you need not answer:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that driving
the car at said rate of speed, if you have found that it was so driven,
was negligence?"
Answer "yes" or "no."
If you have answered the foregoing issue "yes," then you will an-
swer the following question; otherwise you need not answer:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such neg.
ligence, if any you have found, was a proximate cause of the col-
lision?"
Similar questions would be asked as to loss of control, and
then there would be a submission of the issue of damages, which,
of course, would be applicable to both sets of issues. Each set of
issues in the above illustration would constitute an independent
ground of recovery-when the common issue of damages is added
thereto.
Using the quoted part of the charge as an illustration, the ques-
tion of speeding would be the root issue. The questions of
negligence and proximate cause would be ancillary issues. As the
question of collision was referred to as a primary root issue, it is
logical to refer to the question of speeding as a secondary ground
of recovery, consisting of the secondary root issue of speeding,
1952]
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with the ancillary issues of negligence and proximate cause. Ques-
tions of whether an issue is too ultimate, sufficiently ultimate or
evidentiary are usually with reference to the secondary root issue.
Thus, if we find that the question of speeding is sufficiently ulti-
mate, the ancillary issues of negligence and proximate cause
follow almost automatically.
This same analysis is applicable to any affirmative defense
which, standing alone, could possibly defeat plaintiff's alleged
cause of action.7 Such a defense is correctly called an independent
ground of defense. Frequently such a ground will consist of
several ultimate issues. For example, defendant may accuse plain-
tiff of having committed various acts, charging that each act was
negligence and that such negligence was a proximate cause of
the collision. Each such secondary root act, when joined by its
ancillary issues of negligence and proximate cause, would con-
stitute an independent ground of defense, provided the root act
was sufficiently ultimate. Thus, defendant might allege that plain-
tiff was driving at an excessive rate of speed, to-wit, 40 miles an
hour, and that this was negligence, which in turn was a proximate
cause. Here we have an independent ground of defense consisting
of three ultimate issues, the root issue of speeding and the ancil-
lary issues of negligence and proximate cause Those issues could
be submitted in the same form as that heretofore suggested as to
an independent ground of recovery. The only change would be
that the word "plaintiff" would be substituted for the word
"defendant."
As stated, the usual difficulty is in determining whether a root
issue is evidentiary, sufficiently ultimate or too ultimate. There
is an important difference between an issue which is too ultimate
and one which is evidentiary. If an issue is too ultimate, it can
7 The distinction between an affirmative defense and a rebuttal defense will be dis.
cussed later.
s Although in some cases "ultimate issue" and "independent ground" have been
used interchangeably, it is submitted that the analysis suggested herein is preferable
and is in accord with the applicable rules, particularly Rule 279.
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support a judgment. In fact, there is no objection to such sub-
mission unless complaint is properly and timely made. On the
other hand, if the issue is evidentiary, it cannot form the basis for
a judgment even in the absence of complaint.9
(b) Effect of grouping in one issue evidentiary matters or
two or more ultimate fact questions; effect of assuming existence
of ultimate fact; the harmless error rule.
It is well established that where it takes several evidentiary facts
to make an ultimate fact, the trial court may properly group the
evidentiary facts in one issue. It is also established that if two
ultimate disputed fact questions are included in one issue, this
is error, the same rule being applicable to an issue which assumes
one disputed ultimate fact issue in the submission of another dis-
puted ultimate fact issue. Further, it is error to advise the jury
as to an undisputed ultimate fact issue, unless so doing clarifies
submission of another disputed ultimate fact issue.'" As is true as
to other rules applicable to special issues submission, the trial
court has broad discretion in this area; further, the appellate
courts are increasingly liberal, and properly so, in applying the
harmless error rule."
(c) Examples of some of the above principles.2
In Dakan v. Humphreys" suit was brought for damages alleged
to have been caused by defendant's dogs killing plaintiff's sheep
and goats. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in allow-
ing his dogs to roam at large. Defendant complained of the charge
on the ground that it did not include issues on whether the dogs
were sheep killers and, if so, whether defendant had notice thereof.
The court said:
9 See, for example, Ormsby v. Ratcliffe, 298 S. W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), afl'd,
117 Tex. 242, 1 S. W. 2d 1084 (1928).
10 Boaz v. White's Auto Stores, 141 Tex. 366, 172 S. W. 2d 481 (1943).
11 Rule 434.
12 Most of the examples appear in 2 FRUMER AND MASTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TEXAS COURTS (1950) 628 et seq.
13 190 S. W. 2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
1952]
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We are of the opinion that said issues requested by defendant were
evidentiary only.... The ultimate issues, we think, were substantially
as follows: (1) Whether defendant's dogs killed plaintiff's sheep and
goats, and, since it was undisputed that defendant permitted his dogs
to run at large, (2) whether defendant was negligent in permitting
his dogs to run at large, (3) whether such negligence was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's damage, and (4) the amount of damages. 14
A similar result was reached in Texas and N.O.R. Co. v.
Sturgeon," cited in the Dakan case, in Which the question was
whether the trial court erred in failing to submit whether the rail-
way employees had notice that Sturgeon might attempt to get on
the footboard in question. The supreme court said:
The matter of knowledge on the part of Hobson and the engine
foreman with respect to Sturgeon's whereabouts and intention was
evidentiary in its bearing upon the controlling issues of negligence
and proximate cause.... The controlling issues were fairly submitted
and there was no reason for submitting other phases of the same
issues.16
Several cases have held that intoxication usually is evidentiary
and cannot constitute a root issue. See, for example, Benoit v.
Wilson,'7 Langham v. Talbot,'" and Scott v. Gardner.'9 An auto-
mobile accident was involved in the last case, in which the court
said:
The question of appellant's intoxication was not an ultimate fact
issue and it was not necessary that it be submitted to the jury as an
issue. The trial court's action in not so submitting it was correct.
Appellant's intoxication was a fact to be considered by the jury, to-
gether with other circumstances, in answering the third special issue
in the trial court's charge, which in our opinion sufficiently and cor-
14 Id. at 375.
15 142 Tex. 222, 177 S. W. 2d 264 (1944).
16 Id. at 225, 177 S. W. 2d at 265.
' 239 S. W. 2d 792 (Tex. 1951).
is 211 S. W. 2d 987 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. rel. n.r.e.
19 137 Tex. 628, 156 S. W. 2d 513 (1941).
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rectly submitted the question as to appellant's heedless and reckless
disregard, or conscious indifference. 20  1
Thus, if intoxication is submitted with the ancillary issues of
negligence, proximate cause, and damages, and all are answered
favorably to plaintiff, this would usually not support a judgment
for plaintiff, for the reason that the root issue is evidentiary.
Notice that the examples given meet the suggested guide that
if the fact is affirmative, it will usually be held ultimate, whereas
if it is passive, it will usually be held evidentiary. A helpful test
is: could this act standing alone possibly constitute negligence?
Intoxication alone could not cause injury to a third party; at the
same time it might be potent evidence of speeding, loss of con-
rol, failure to keep a proper lookout, or some other affirmative
fact.2 '
In Northern Texas Traction Company v. Bruce,2" the court sub-
mitted issues of contributory negligence of plaintiff, based upon
(1) failure to look, (2) failure to listen, and (3) attempting to
cross the tracks. The appellate court held that it was reversible
error not to submit an additional issue on whether plaintiff sud-
denly turned his car from the highway onto the tracks, saying:
If the dictionary definition controlled, then there would be only
one ultimate issue of negligence of appellant and only one of con-
tributory negligence of appellee, which latter would be the one sub-
mitted: "Was the plaintiff negligent in attempting to cross defendant's
track under the facts and circumstances when he did attempt to
cross?" That issue comprehends all, either directly or by inference.
But in the law of special issues many issues are considered ultimate
which of themselves do not necessarily decide the controversy between
the parties.2
8
201 d. at 638, 156 S. W. 2d at 518.
21 It may be argued that failure to keep a proper lookout is passive. If this argu-
ment is sound, it illustrates that the suggested rule -will not always work, because it is
established that failure to keep a lookout is sufficiently ultimate to be a root issue.
22 77 S. W. 2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) er. dism.
28 Id. at 890.
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In Hough v. Grapotte24 the court said:
The principal contention presented is that the court should not
have submitted the issue of domicile. It is argued that domicile is not
an ultimate fact, but that the real ultimate fact issues, are, first, resi-
dence; and, second, intention of Galbraith to make the residence his
home. The question has been many times determined contrary to this
contention. Multiplicity of issues should be avoided and only the
ultimate issues submitted which will form the basis of a judgment.
The issues of residence and intention are merely elements of the con-
trolling issue of domicile and were included in and disposed of by
the answer to the more comprehensive issue. 25
In Kincaid v. Long 6 the jury found in response to one issue
that just prior to the collision in question the plaintiff was driving
her car in the center of the highway. The ruling of the trial court
was upheld that such answer conflicted with the answer to another
issue that plaintiff did not fail to yield the right of way. Implicit
in the holding is that the trial court is not required to-in truth,
should not-submit different shades of the same ultimate issue."
In Schuhmacher Co. v. Holcomb,"s the action of the trial court
in refusing to submit issues based upon the asserted root issue
of defective brakes was upheld on the ground that the matter of
defective brakes was evidentiary as to the ultimate root issue
of loss of control.
In Fort Worth & D. C. Ry. Co. v. Capehart29 the court sub-
mitted an issue upon plaintiff's failure to keep a proper lookout.
Defendant requested that issues on such failure be submitted more
specifically. The action of the trial court in refusing to do so was
upheld, the court saying:
On this feature of appellants' defense, what was the controlling
issue? Wasn't it the question of whether Mrs. Capehart failed to keep
24 127 Tex. 144, 90 S. W. 2d 1090 (1936).
25 1d. at 146, 90 S. W. 2d at 1091.
28 135 S. W. 2d 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
27 Rule 279.
28142 Tex. 332, 177 S. W. 2d 951 (1944).
29 210 S. W. 2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.
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a proper lookout for her own safety in respect to the instances pleaded
by appellants.... If said issue as framed was broad and clear enough
to include all three of these instances pleaded, then it would not be
incumbent upon the court to submit the same question to the jury in
separate issues.30
The above case supports the proposition that failure to keep
a proper lookout is a sufficiently ultimate issue to be a root issue,
but that further "pulverization" would result in evidentiary issues.
In Ohlen v. Hagar"' issues were submitted on whether defend-
ant ejected plaintiff from a cafe, with ancillary issues of negli-
gence, etc. Defendant contended for an issue on whether he threw
plaintiff into a glass door. The court in overruling this contention
said:
The question as to whether appellee was thrown against the door
is one of the evidentiary issues and constitutes a part of the proof of
the controlling issue of appellant's inflicting an injury upon appellee
while forcibly ejecting her.3 2
In Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Brumbaugh"s issues were
submitted on whether plaintiff was an employee of L. Coffee and
in the course of his employment at the time of his injury. De-
fendant's request for an issue on whether plaintiff was on leave
of absence at the time in question was held properly refused as
being evidentiary.
Many cases could be referred to which involve the matter of
.submitting two ultimate issues in a single question, or of assuming
one disputed ultimate fact in the submission of an issue as to
another. However, such treatment is deemed unnecessary in view
of a recent supreme court decision which reviews at length many
prior opinions in this field. The case is Eubanks v. Texas Em-
30 Id. at 843, 844.
s' 212 S. W. 2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) er. ref. n.r.e.
32 Id. at 256, 257.
33 224 S. W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) er. ref. n.r.e.
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ployers' Ins. Ass'n. 4 and involved the following issue, submitted in
a workmen's compensation case:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that J. L.
Eubanks sustained personal injuries during the first two weeks of
January, 1945, as a result of being struck a blow on his head by a
piece of timber?
Defendant's written objections to this issue were that it was a
comment on the weight of the evidence in assuming a controverted
fact, namely, whether the plaintiff was struck on the head by a
piece of timber.
The supreme court held that the issue was not objectionable.
The court cited, among others, cases holding that a grouping of
evidentiary facts which add up to an ultimate fact is not erro-
neous.3 5 The opinion includes such a comprehensive review and
analysis of prior cases that only a reference thereto, with a strong
recommendation that it be read and reread, appears in order.
III
INSTRUCTIONS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM ISSUES
As stated earlier, in submission by a general charge, numerous
instructions were included. The difference between instructions
and issues is that an issue asks a question whereas an instruc-
tion advises the jury as to a rule of law. Under the general charge
practice, it was customary for instructions to refer to the very
facts in question. Prior to 1941, under special issue submission,
just about any reference to the specific facts of a case subjected
a charge to the objection that it was a general charge. 6 In that
year Rule 277 was amended by adding, among others, a provision
that instructions shall not subject the charge to the objection that
it is a general charge.
34 246 S. W. 2d 462 (Tex. 1952).
35 See, for example, Howell v. Howell, 147 Texas 14, 210 S. W. 2d 978 (1948), and
Austin v. De George, 55 S. W. 2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) er. dism.
36 See, for example, Davis v. Clark, 129 Tex. 520, 105 S. W. 2d 190 (1937).
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Since the indicated change, the trial court has broad discretion
in instructing with reference to the specific facts involved. In fact,
it seems that many matters, particularly rebuttal matters, which
once required questions, can now be covered by instructions."
Any instruction which refers to the specific facts is still subject
to the requirement that it must not include a comment on the
weight of the evidence.
Of necessity, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding
what instructions should be given. Thus, an instruction as to cir-
cumstantial evidence has been upheld, and a refusal to give such
an instruction has been upheld."8 This discretion is not without
limits, as illustrated by a case holding that it was an abuse of
discretion to refuse to instruct as to the degree of care which by
law a child is required to exercise. 9
IV
RULE THAT EACH SIDE Is ENTITLED TO AN UNCONDITIONAL
SUBMISSION OF ITS CASE-FIXING BURDEN OF PROOF-
REBUTTAL ISSUES
Usually the plaintiff's case is limited to his prima facie cause
or causes of action. Sometimes he will have affirmative defenses
to affirmative defenses, or rebuttal defenses to affirmative defenses;
in these instances the rules relative to submission of defendant's
case, hereinafter discussed, are applicable.
First, let us consider submission of plaintiff's prima facie case
in a collision case. This will usually include submission of several
secondary grounds of recovery. As to each issue constituting an
essential part of such a ground, the burden of proof is upon the
plaintiff. The usual and preferable way of placing this burden
37 See, for example, Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S. W. 2d 453 (1944);
Viduarri v. Bruni, 179 S. W. 2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) er. ref. w.o.m.
s8 Johnson v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 232, 205 S. W.
2d 353 (1947) ; Larson v. Ellison, 147 Tex. 465, 217 S. W. 2d 420 (1949).
39 Dallas Railway and Terminal Co. v. Rogers, 147 Tex. 617, 218 S. W. 2d 456 (1949).
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is by starting each question with, "Do you find from a prepond-
erance of the evidence." Under this form, the jury can answer
"yes" only if it thinks the evidence preponderates in favor of such
an answer. If it thinks the scales are equally balanced, an answer
of "no" is required. It is error for the court to fail properly to
place the burden of proof, as for example, by a charge "was or was
not the act negligence" or "answer, yes or no as you may find
from a preponderance of the evidence."4
When we come to the defendant's side of the case, we are con-
fronted with the important distinction between affirmative defenses
and rebuttal defenses. An affirmative defense is one which is some-
times referred to as a plea in confession and avoidance. Usually
it admits that at least a part of what plaintiff alleges is true but
that in spite of this, defendant has a good defense. One definition
sometimes found of such a defense is that it admits that plaintiff
at one time had a cause of action, but because of something hap-
pening later, defendant should prevail. This definition, while
helpful, is too restrictive. Thus, contributory negligence is an
affirmative defense but will not meet the test above stated." It is
suggested that a correct test could be stated as follows: if plain-
tiff's prima facie case be assumed to be true, still the defense
would defeat it. Stated in another way, if the defensive matter is
fatally inconsistent with plaintiff's prima facie case, then it con-
stitutes a rebuttal defense. For example, unavoidable accident, or
the defense that a third party was the sole proximate cause, is a
rebuttal matter, because each is fatally inconsistent with the
contention that defendant was negligent."2
Problems incident to submitting affirmative defenses are gov-
erned by the same rules which apply to submission of plaintiff's
prima facie case. The same difficulties are present in determining
40 Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 135 Tex. 232, 141 S. W. 2d 312 (1940).
41lRule 94 lists some affirmative defenses but by its very terms is not exclusive.
Others are included in Rule 266.
42 See Hicks v. Brown, 136 Tex. 399, 151 S. W. 2d 790 (1941) ; Green, Proximate
Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1950).
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whether the root issue is sufficiently ultimate. Similarly, when this
barrier is crossed, the ancillary issues follow almost as a matter
of course. As the burden of proof is upon defendant to prove such
defenses, there is no difficulty in wording each ultimate issue
which constitutes a part of an independent ground of defense.
Each can start with the phrase, "Do you find from a prepond-
erance."
In many cases the statement is found that each party is entitled
to an unconditional submission of his case."3 This rule involves no
difficulty as to affirmative defenses. This is not true, however, as
to rebuttal defenses.
As indicated, a rebuttal defense is one which is fatally incon-
sistent with some part of plaintiff's prima facie case. Evidence
as to most rebuttal matters is admissible under a general denial,
although such denial is not broad enough to cover all rebuttal
matters. For example, Rule 93 requires that certain rebuttal
matters be specifically alleged under oath, or the contrary will be
admitted."'
If it is a rebuttal fact, regardless of whether evidence would be
admissible under a general denial, in no event is defendant en-
titled to submission thereof unless it is specifically pleaded, or
falls within the exceptions included within the following excerpt
from Rule 279:
When the court submits a case upon special issues, he shall sub-
mit the controlling issues made by the written pleadings and the evi-
dence, and, except in trespass to try title, statutory partition proceed-
ings and other special proceedings in which the pleadings are
specially defined by statutes or procedural rules, a party shall not
be entitled to an affirmative submission of any issue in his behalf
where such issue is raised only by a general denial and not by an
affirmative written pleading on his part. Nothing herein shall change
the burden of proof from what it would have been under a general
denial.
4s The case usually cited as the basic case on this proposition is Fox v. Dallas Hotel
Co., 111 Tex. 461, 240 S. W. 517 (1922).
"4 See, also, Rule 54 and the last sentence of Rule 97.
1952]
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Even if a rebuttal issue is pleaded, it does not follow that it
should be submitted. Two other requirements must be met. The
issue must be sufficiently ultimate. Even if sufficiently ultimate, it
must not be a direct opposite of one of plaintiff's issues. Logically,
these rules would preclude submission of any rebuttal issue; how-
ever, in the present state of the law at least some such issues can
be submitted and, perhaps, must be submitted.
First, let us look at the requirement that the issue must be
ultimate. Logically, any rebuttal issue is evidentiary, because it is
opposed to some part of plaintiff's prima facie case. However, the
test usually applied to such an issue is whether it, standing alone,
could possibly be decisive. This test justifies submission of the
usual rebuttal issues of unavoidable accident and third party as
a sole proximate cause."
Next let us consider the rule that a defendant is not entitled to
submission of an issue which is an exact opposite of one of plain-
tiff's issues. Logically, every rebuttal issue is such a direct opposite.
However, the Texas Supreme Court in Wright v. Traders & Gen-
eral Insurance Co.46 made a distinction between converse issues
and direct opposites. The court said:
It is true that a finding of total incapacity excludes the converse
of partial incapacity, and vice versa. In that sense converse issues
are involved. The issues submitting the two inquiries as to the result
of the injuries,-one whether total and the other whether partial,-
are converse, but not opposite. Failure to observe the distinction be-
tween the types of issues that are converse and those that are opposite,
leads to practical difficulties in submitting a cause involving both
types, in order to avoid duplication.47
In several courts of civil appeals opinions in boundary suits, the
Wright case has been cited as requiring that defendant's theory
as to boundary be submitted.4"
45 See note 42 supra.
46 132 Tex. 172, 123 S. W. 2d 314 (1939).
471 d. at 177, 123 S. W. 2d at 317.
48 See, for example, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Owings, 128 S. W. 2d 67 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939).
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Mr. Clayton Orn, in referring to this and similar cases, said
of the Wright case:
The court in that case held, in effect, that if the defensive term is
merely the opposite of the plaintiff's issue, it need not be submitted,
but if the defensive issue is the converse of an issue submitted for the
plaintiff, it must be submitted at the defendant's request. However,
the obscure distinction between converse issues and opposite issues,
as they may relate to boundary suits, has not been discussed in the
opinions.
The burden is quite heavy on the plaintiff when he must show
where the line is located, and where it is not located.49
Assuming that a rebuttal issue is sufficiently ultimate and not
a direct opposite, difficulties remain. One is in fixing the burden of
proof without having a double negative. This results from the fact
that the burden is on plaintiff to negative the truth of the rebuttal
matter. Thus, unavoidable accident, a rebuttal defense, can be
submitted as follows:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the de-
ceased's death was not the result of an unavoidable accident? Answer
''yes" or "no.155
Obviously, jurors, as well as any one else, might be confused
by what "yes" means and what "no" means. To avoid this con-
fusion, Rule 277 was amended in 1941 to include the following
statement:
It is proper to so frame the issue as to place the burden of proof
thereon, but where, in the opinion of the court, this cannot be done
without complicating the form of the issue, the burden of proof on
such issue may be placed by a separate instruction thereon.
In Vanover v. Henwood,51 the rebuttal issue was submitted as
follows:
4 This statement is a part of a lecture delivered by Mr. Orn during Lawyers Week
in April, 1952, at Southern Methodist University at an institute on "Preparation and
Trial of a Land Suit." The lecture, along with other articles, will soon be published by
the Southwestern Legal Foundation.
50Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Giun, 131 Tex. 548, 116 S. W. 2d 693 (1938).
51136 Tex. 348, 150 S. W. 2d 785 (1941).
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Was the injury of the minor, Melvin Vanover, the result of an un-
avoidable accident? Answer "yes" or "no."
In passing upon the above issue you are instructed that unless you
find from a preponderance of the evidence that said injury was not
the result of an unavoidable accident, you will answer said issue
"yes," otherwise you will answer it "no."
Admittedly the instruction is confusing, as it probably must be as
long as rebuttal issues are submitted, but at least the jury can
ignore the instruction and answer a simple question.
The importance of correctly placing the burden to negative upon
plaintiff as to a rebuttal issue cannot be overly stressed because
unless this point is watched, error easily comes in under the prac-
tice of starting a question "do you find from a preponderance." 2
It is strongly recommended that as to any rebuttal issue, the
burden should be fixed by an instruction.
Another rule which gives difficulty as to a rebuttal issue is the
one which entitles each party to an unconditional submission of
his case. Thus, if the court could submit grounds of recovery based
upon various acts of negligence and then submit the issue of
unavoidable accident conditionally-that is, to be answered only
if the negligence grounds are answered adversely to defendant,
the possibility of a fatal conflict between answers would be
avoided. However, such submission would violate the rule that
each party is entitled to unconditional submission of his case, sub-
ject to the above stated rules as to evidentiary issues and exact
opposites.
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide a way to avoid
such conflict, and that is by alternative submission. Rule 277 pro-
vides in part:
Such special issues shall be ... answered by the jury separately,
provided that, if it be deemed advisable, the court may submit dis-
junctively in the same question two inconsistent issues where it is
apparent from the evidence that one or the other of the conditions
52 See Vestal v. Gulf Oil Corp., 235 S. W. 2d 440 (Tex. 1951), in which the burden
was misplaced in a nuisance case.
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or facts inquired about necessarily exists. For example, the court may,
in a workmen's compensation case, submit in one question whether
the injured employee was permanently or only temporarily disabled.
In Wright v. Traders & General Insurance Co.5" the court held
it error to submit conditionally an issue of partial incapacity. The
court stated that an unconditional submission in the form, "Do
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the injuries,
if any, sustained by plaintiff... resulted in the partial incapacity
of plaintiff.. .?" correctly placed the burden of proof insofar as
said issue was a part of plaintiff's case, and also insofar as it was
a part of defendant's case. It is submitted that this dictum is
erroneous as to defendant's case, because insofar as partial in-
capacity is a part of defendant's case, it is a rebuttal defense,
with the burden being on plaintiff to negative the existence of
said fact.
In using alternative submission to avoid conflict, it is essential
to fix the burden of proof by an instruction because of the rule
that the burden is on plaintiff to negative rebuttal matters.
In Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Little54 the court, after sub-
mitting the issue of incapacity, submitted this issue:
Special Issue No. Five. Do you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that defendant's incapacity to labor was "permanent" or
"temporary" ?
Answer by the use of the word "permanent" or by the use of the
word "temporary." If you find from a preponderance of the evidence
that said incapacity to labor was permanent answer "permanent" but
unless you so find from a preponderance of the evidence, answer by the
use of the word "temporary."
This form was held to constitute a sufficiently unconditional sub-
mission of both grounds.
There is a serious question whether the practice of submitting
rebuttal issues should be continued. It would lend to clarity if
53 Cited sapra note 46.
54 188 S. W. 2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. rel. w.o.m.
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such matters were covered by instructions, and there is at least
some authority indicating that a trial court has discretion so to
submit them.5" As pointed out by Professor Leon Green,56 sub-
mitting rebuttal issues amounts to cross-examining the jury. The
argument on the other side (with which this writer disagrees) is
that court room experience has established that rebuttal issues are
frequently essential in order to present fairly the defendant's side
of the case.
V
REQUIREMENT THAT EACH ISSUE BE DISPUTED
It is settled that only disputed fact issues should be submitted
to the jury. This does not mean that it is error to submit undisputed
issues; however, if they are submitted and answered against the
undisputed evidence, the court can correctly render judgment
notwithstanding such answers, provided a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is timely and properly filed and acted
upon.57
If an issue in a jury trial is disputed, the answer of the jury
thereto cannot be ignored, regardless of how much it is against
the great preponderance of the evidence. Let us take excessive
speed of defendant's car as an example, the same test being
applicable to each ultimate fact. First, let us look at all of the
evidence supporting this contention, blinding ourselves to all
adverse evidence. If in this light, reasonable minds could not
differ on the proposition that there was no excessive speed, plain-
tiff will as a matter of law lose as to a ground of recovery based
upon this root issue. If said evidence is such that reasonable
minds may draw different inferences, then the question is one for
the jury, and we need inquire no further as to this issue in deter-
mining whether it should be submitted. If considering said favor-
55 See Pearson v. Doherty and Viduarri v. Bruni, cited supra note 37.
56 Green, Special Issues, 14 Tex. B. J. 521 (1951).
57 Rule 301; Hines v. Parks, 128 Tex. 289, 96 S. W. 2d 970 (1936).
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able evidence, reasonable minds could not differ on the proposi-
tion that there was excessive speed, then we have the possibility of
an affirmative answer and look only to the evidence supporting a
negative question. If in this light reasonable minds could at least
differ as to the answer, then there is a jury question. This differ-
ence between undisputed evidence or no evidence on one side
and preponderance on the other is an important one. To repeat,
if the matter is one of preponderance, no matter how great, the
court can never render a judgment contrary to a jury answer
against the preponderance. The court can and should grant a new
trial, but this is the extent of the relief to which the injured party
is entitled.5" In this connection, if the only testimony is that of
a party to the suit, regardless of how clear, this issue is disputed
because the question of credibility is for the jury.59
VI
EFFECT OF PARTIAL SUBMISSION OF DISPUTED ULTIMATE FACTS IN
ABSENCE OF PROPER COMPLAINT
(a) Rule where an entire ground of recovery or defense is
omitted from a charge and proper complaint is not made.
If all of the elements of an entire ground of recovery or defense
are undisputed, said ground is not waived. This is because such a
ground is correctly omitted from the charge.
If, however, one or more elements of a ground of recovery or
defense are disputed, and none Qf said elements is included in
the charge, and proper complaint is not made, this ground is
waived by the party relying thereon. This result follows from a
portion of Rule 279:-"
58 Harpold v. Moss, 101 Tex. 540, 109 S. W. 928 (1908) ; Casey v. Jones, 189 S. W.
2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) er. rel. w.o.m.
59 Octane Oil Refining Co. v. Blankenship-Antilley Implement Co., 117 S. W. 2d
885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). This same rule can be important in determining whether
a summary judgment should be granted.
60 This carries forward the rule stated in Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. v. Pepper,
134 Tex. 360, 135 S. W. 2d 79 (1940). In that case the court sometimes used "inde-
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Upon appeal all independent grounds of recovery or of defense not
conclusively established under the evidence and upon which no issue
is given or requested shall be deemed as waived....
(b) Rule where part of an independent ground of recovery,
which is necessarily referable thereto, is included and a disputed
part is omitted, and proper complaint is not made of the omission.
In this situation the ground of recovery or defense is not waived.
By failing to complain, the parties simply agree that the judge
can decide the omitted disputed fact issues in question. He can
do this by an express finding. If he does not make an express
finding, there will be a conclusive presumption on appeal that he
found in such a way as to support his judgment. For example,
suppose an issue is submitted on whether defendant was driving
at about forty miles an hour, which is answered in the affirmative.
Suppose further that no issues are submitted, and no complaint
made thereof, as to the ancillary and disputed issues of negli-
gence, proximate cause and damages. The judge could make
ancillary express findings, which might require a judgment for
plaintiff or might require a judgment for defendant. Thus, if he
found negligence and damages for plaintiff, but also that the sec-
ondary root issue of speeding was not a proximate cause, defend-
ant would be entitled to judgment.
If the judge made no express ancillary findings but rendered a
judgment, there would be a conclusive presumption on appeal that
he found in such a way as to support the judgment. Thus, if judg-
ment is for plaintiff, there will be a conclusive presumption that
the omitted issues were found in his favor; if judgment is for
defendant, there will be a conclusive presumption that the judge
found one or more of the omitted issues in favor of defendant.
These rules are set forth in Rule 279 as follows:
... but where such ground of recovery or of defense consists of
more than one issue, if one or more of the issues necessary to sustain
pendent ground" and "ultimate issues" as synonymous expressions. As before sug-
gested, a clearer analysis is possible if "independent ground" is treated as a cause
of action or a complete defense, and an "ultimate issue" as an essential part thereof.
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such ground of recovery or of defense, and necessarily referable there-
to, are submitted to and answered by the jury, and one or more of
such issues are omitted, without such request, or objection, and there
is evidence to support a finding thereon, the trial court, at the request
of either party, may after notice and hearing and at any time before
the judgment is rendered, make and file written findings on such
omitted issue or issues in support of the judgment, but if no such
written findings are made, such omitted issue or issues shall be deemed
as found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment.
The court has no authority to make ancillary findings and there
will be no presumptions in the following instances: when the issue
is submitted but not answered by the jury; when proper complaint
is made of the failure to submit such issue; when the issue is one
not necessarily referable to the ground in question, a matter dis-
cussed further under the next subdivision; when the issue is un-
disputed;61 when the omitted matter was not pleaded. In connec-
tion with this last possible ground, Rule 274 provides that lack
of pleading is waived unless an issue not supported thereby is
objected to upon that ground. However, it is difficult to justify
application of this rule to an omitted issue. Possibly the courts
will hold that if evidence comes in without objection, the lack of
pleading is waived even as to an omitted issue.62 It is submitted
that this is what the courts should hold.
(c) Rule applicable when an issue which is submitted is not
necessarily referable to the ground of recovery or defense in
question.
Rule 279 in referring to partial submission expressly limits the
right of the judge to find upon unsubmitted issues to a situation
where the unsubmitted issue is necessarily referable to a ground
of recovery which is allegedly partially submitted. A typical
example is the issue of damages in a negligence case. Usually
numerous secondary grounds of recovery are submitted, based
upon secondary root issues. Each ground will include the second-
I1 See Willeke v. Bailey, 144 Tex. 157, 189 S. W. 2d 477 (1945).
62 See Rules 66, 67 and 90. But see Harkey v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 146 Tex.
504, 208 S. W. 2d 919 (1948).
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ary root issue relied upon with the ancillary issues of negligence
and proximate cause. However, as the issue of damages is common
to all of said secondary grounds of recovery, it will be submitted
but once. For example, plaintiff may have alleged speeding, loss
of control, failure to keep a proper lookout, and other secondary
root issues, with sufficient allegations of negligence and proximate
cause. Suppose that the evidence is in dispute as to each of said
secondary root issues, but that the only ones submitted by the
charge, each with its ancillary issues of negligence and proximate
cause, are speeding and loss of control. Suppose further that the
common issue of damages is submitted. Question: Does the sub-
mission of damages constitute a partial submission of failure to
keep a proper lookout?6" The answer would seem to be clear that
this is not such a partial submission, because the issue of damages
is not necessarily referable to the ground of recovery based upon
failure to keep a proper lookout.64 Of course, if this had been the
only ground of recovery alleged, the answer would be in favor of
partial submission.
VII
PRESERVING ERROR TO DEFECTS IN THE CHARGE
(a) Generally. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure contem-
plate that as soon as possible after both sides have rested, the
judge will furnish each side with a tentative form of his charge,
to the jury. Many times this charge will include suggestions made
by one side or the other; however, the tentative charge is that of'
the judge.
After each side has been handed a copy of the tentative charge,
63 It is pointed out that if the issue of failure to keep a proper lookout is accom-
panied by a definition, it is unnecessary to submit an issue as to whether such failure
was negligence. In fact, submission of the latter issue might result in a conflict.
64 See Colbert v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank, 129 Tex. 235, 102 S. W. 2d 1031
(1937), commented on in 16 Tex. L. Rev. 95 (1937) ; Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v.
Reed, 150 S. W. 2d 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) er. ref.; Dooley, The Use of Special'
Issues Under the New State and Federal Rules, 20 Tex. L. Rev. 32 (1941); Note,.
23 Tex. L. Rev. 189 (1943).
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it becomes the duty of each to make whatever objections and
requests it deems appropriate. A failure to complain properly
at this stage of the proceedings waives all defects, except the fol-
lowing: if some elements of an independent ground are submitted,
but some omitted, the omitted elements are not waived; irrelevant
issues have no weight, and neither do evidentiary issues, except
for the possibility of a conflict between an ultimate issue and an
evidentiary issue; the contention that an answer to an issue is
against the undisputed evidence, or that it is supported by no
evidence, can be raised for the first time after verdict by motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or part of the verdict,
and this is true (and properly so) even though the objecting party
requested the issue.6 5
(b) Rules relating to issues as distinguished from instructions.
A special issue asks a question; an instruction advises the jury
as to a question or questions of law.
If a special issue is omitted, and the party of whose case the
issue is a part desires its submission, then said party has the
burden to request its submission, accompanying said request with
a substantially correct issue.6 6 It has been held that if a special
issue involves a word which the jury would not understand, the
requested issue must be accompanied by a substantially correct
instruction. 7 The purpose of the rule is to place the burden upon
the party desiring the issue to formulate it in substantially cor-
rect terms. After all, if he has properly prepared for trial, he
should be able to formulate a special issue.
At least one case has held that each requested special issue
should be on a separate sheet of paper.6" This is to enable the trial
judge to include the requested issue in his charge, if he thinks it
65 Rule 279 (last sentence). Again attention is called to the difference between
undisputed evidence or no evidence on one hand and preponderance on the other hand.
66 Rule 279.
67 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Garner, 170 S. W. 2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.
1943) er. ref. As to a requested issue held to be not in substantially correct form see
Jones v. Rainey, 168 S. W. 2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. ref.
68 Walton v. West Texas Utilities Co., 161 S. W. 2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) er. ref.
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should be included, without rewriting it. This procedure is par-
ticularly helpful to a trial judge who follows the practice of using
a separate page for each issue and a separate page for each in-
struction. Whether this procedure is used or whether several
issues are included on a single page, it is important that the
charge be so framed as not to indicate which party requested a
given issue. However, it is submitted that the harmless error rule
should be liberally applied both as to this matter and that of
including more than one requested issue on the same page.
If the issue omitted is a part of the other side's case, then an
objection clearly pointing out the defect is sufficient.69 If an issue
is included in the tentative charge which is defective, as distin-
guished from being omitted, then it seems clear that an objec-
tion by either party clearly pointing out the defect is sufficient.70
To summarize, if an issue is omitted, a request and tender of a
substantially correct issue is necessary, if the issue is a part of the
case of the one complaining. An objection clearly pointing out the
defect is sufficient if the opposite party is the one complaining.7'
For example, assume that the tentative charge includes an issue
on whether defendant was driving at or about forty miles per
hour, but no issues as to negligence and proximate cause are
included therein. If plaintiff desires issues as to said matters, re-
quests plus substantially correct issues are required. If the defend-
ant desires issues, an objection clearly pointing to the omissions
is sufficient. If said issue as to speeding is defective, an objection
by either party, clearly pointing out the defect, would suffice.
It is not correct that complaint should always be made of
omissions. Thus, if an entire ground of recovery is omitted, the
defendant would certainly not desire to object, for the very good
reason that the plaintiff has waived that ground, if any part thereof
69 Rules 274 and 279; Thompson v. Sisti, 224 S. W. 2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
70 See note 69 supra; see also Robertson & Mueller v. Holden, 1 S. W. 2d 570 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1928).
71 Rules 274 and 279; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Mallard, 143 Tex. 77, 182
S. W. 2d 1000 (1944) ; Robertson & Mueller v. Holden, note 70 supra.
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is disputed, unless he makes correct requests. Further, where there
is a partial submission, the party considering whether to complain
should decide whether he would rather have the omitted issue or
issues decided by the jury or by the judge.
(c) Rules relating to instructions, as distinguished from issues.
These rules can be simply stated. If the tentative charge omits a
desired instruction, then such an instruction in substantially cor-
rect form must be submitted, and this is true regardless of
whether the instruction is a part of the case of the one complaining,
or a part of his opponent's case. If an instruction is included in
the tentative charge but is defective, then an objection clearly
pointing out the defect suffices. Thus, as to a defective instruction,
the rule is the same as to a defective issue. The rule is different
as to an omission. If an instruction is omitted, either party must
submit an instruction in substantially correct wording thereon; if
an issue is submitted, the same rule is applicable as to a complaint
by the party relying thereon; an objection, however, clearly point-
ing out the defect, is all that is required of the opposite party.
(d) Preserving error for appeal.
As before stated, each request for an issue should be on a sep-
arate sheet of paper. Under Rule 276 a sufficient bill of exceptions
is preserved if the court notes thereon, "refused."
For example, a request could read as follows:
No ................
(Style) (Court)
Defendant requests the court to submit to the jury the following
issue:
(set forth)




The same rule is applicable to objections, except that they need
not be limited to one objection to a page. Further, with consent
of the parties, objections can be dictated to the court reporter and
transcribed after verdict. It is important to have the judge present
when this practice is used and to have the reporter's notes set
forth his ruling on each objection. After the objections are reduced
to writing, the court should expressly overrule each such objec-
tion theretofore overruled. The suggested procedure avoids the
possibility of any controversy as to whether the objections were
timely made and as to the rulings thereon.
(e) Effect of changes in the tentative charge.
If a judge changes his tentative charge either by including re-
quested issues or instructions, or by omitting one or more, then the
charge as changed becomes the tentative charge, and all of the
above rules are as applicable to the changed tentative charge as
they were to the original tentative charge. One trial judge recently
commented, in effect:
If one side levels numerous objections to an instruction, I simply
change my tentative charge by eliminating said instruction. I then
advise counsel: All right, now the charge has no instruction; if you
want one, go ahead and write it.
(f) Effect of including numerous requests or objections which
should not be given or sustained with some which should.
Rule 274 provides in part:
Where the objection made by the complaining party, or an instruc-
tion, issue, definition, or explanatory instruction requested by him,
is in the opinion of the appellate court obscured or concealed by
voluminous unfounded objections, minute differentiations or nu-
merous unnecessary requests, such objection or request shall be un-
tenable.
This rule points to the importance of having all requests and
objections filed in the cause and included in the transcript.
The story is told of a trial judge who interrupted a lawyer who
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was dictating numerous objections to the court reporter with the
question: "Are you really serious about the last objection?" To
which the lawyer replied: "Judge, that's what the State of Texas
pays you good money to sit up there and guess about." This reply
would not now be entirely accurate in view of the above quoted
part of Rule 274.
VIII
CONCLUSION
After 1913, when the form of submission changed from that
of a general charge to special issues, the pendulum swung all the
way against using instructions referring to the specific facts in the
case. Since the above mentioned amendment to Rule 277, the
pendulum has swung partially back. This, as well as other im-
provements and the present policy of appellate courts of giving
the trial court broad discretion in preparing his charge, have
enabled and are enabling trial courts to include relatively few
issues, worded in understandable language, in most cases. A val-
uable aid is found in the following part of Rule 279:
Where the court has fairly submitted the controlling issues raised
by such pleading and the evidence, the case shall not be reversed be.
cause of the failure to submit other and various phases or different
shades of the same issue.
It is believed that some complaints that it is difficult to formulate
a special issue stem from a lack of knowledge of basic procedural
rules-the differences between plaintiff's prima facie case, affirma-
tive defenses and rebuttal defenses, and the importance thereof;
and sometimes from a lack of adequate knowledge of what are the
controlling facts.
The pleader should plead ultimate facts. If he knows how to
plead them, he should know how to formulate issues as to them.
To use the example heretofore used, suppose a plaintiff alleges
that defendant was driving at about forty miles per hour, that
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this was negligence and that said negligence was a proximate cause
of injury. The root issue of speeding and the ancillary issues of
negligence and proximate cause can be lifted almost verbatim
from the petition. It is, of course, necessary to insert the prelim-
'inary phrase of "Do you find from a preponderance" as to each
issue."
72 Matters arising after preparation of the charge are beyond the scope of the
present article.
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